3.5] India Pakistan Relations

1. Introduction to India Pakistan Relations

India and Pakistan were born out of a conflict and have reached their youth with a sustained series of collisions. A number of factors have been identified as the causes of the India-Pakistan conflict, including the inability of the British to oversee a peaceful and politically acceptable Partition, the political rivalries between the main religious communities of the Subcontinent, namely Muslims, Sikhs, and Hindus, the struggle for control over Kashmir, the significance of Kashmir to the national identities of both states, and the personal shortsightedness or greed of leaders on both side­­­s of the border, particularly Mohammed Ali Jinnah’s religious zeal, shortsightedness, and vanity (the Indian interpretation).

2. Conflict: Some Theoretical Considerations

We can begin with the Stephan Walt who critiqued the realist ‘balance of power’ theory and proposed the ‘balance of threat’ in his book ‘The Origin of Alliances’. According to him, states actually react to the perceived threat, instead of aiming to gain power, or balance it. Walt lists four factors that states consider when assessing another state’s threat:

1. The other state’s overall strength or power (people, size, latent power, and economic capabilities);
2. Its proximity to them;
3. Their offensive capabilities; and
4. Their hostile or offensive intentions.

In the similar line, the world’s most difficult conflicts are ‘Paired Minority Conflicts’, according to renowned South Asian scholar Stephan Cohen. Such disputes stem from the belief held by significant numbers on both sides—even those that may even constitute a majority—that they are the weaker, threatened party, under assault from the other side.

Due to its smaller size than India, its inferior conventional military build-up capabilities, and the fact that it was split off from India, Pakistan views itself as a threatened minority. Akbar Zaidi calls this insecurity a ‘post-national condition’ when Pakistan remains obsessed with defining its identity as opposed and different from India.

The main fixation of a large portion of the Indian strategic community is still Pakistan, for historical, geopolitical, ideological, and domestic reasons. Because there is no unified Hindu culture that constitutes the majority, India views itself as an endangered minority and sees itself surrounded by foreign forces. Furthermore, India felt much more threatened when the Cold War ended since it lost its strategic partner, the Soviet Union. The perception of encirclement and threat increases when a significant international ally vanishes.

Surinder Mohan, an Indian researcher, presents a multifaceted analysis of the India-Pakistan relationship in a new book that rejects conventional wisdom, particularly realism’s emphasis on material strength. According to Complex Rivalry: The Dynamics of India-Pakistan Conflict, the two nations’ animosity stems from a distinct confluence of elements, starting with the shock of India’s Partition; ideology, a shared border, and disputed territory have all served to exacerbate relations. Sumit Ganguly, however, points out that the book has certain flaws, such as the way it fails to explicitly recognize the Pakistani military establishment’s political hegemony. In contrast to realist scholars, who nearly solely concentrate on power asymmetries, Mohan contends that domestic politics both sparked and maintained the competition. Over a million people were killed and ten million were relocated as a result of Partition, which had catastrophic aftereffects that deeply impacted both Indian and Pakistani domestic politics. Political leaders became preoccupied on the territorial conflict since both parties are still at odds over the status of Kashmir.

3. History of India Pakistan Relations

On 20 Feb 1947, British Prime Minister Clement Atlee announced its intention to leave Indian subcontinent. On 15^th August 1947, the Indian Independence Act was implemented, creating two independent nations India and Pakistan. Current state of Pakistan and Bangladesh formed Pakistan, while the fate of Kashmir, Junagarh and Hyderabad remained undecided as on 15^th August 1947.

The Radcliffe line as shown in the image separated erstwhile India and Pakistan.

3.1 1947-2000

The relations between India and Pakistan began with conflicts. The 1947 partition of British India created a Muslim-majority Pakistan and a Secular, Hindu-majority India, which led to the current war between India and Pakistan. The India Independence Act gave Jammu and Kashmir’s various regions the freedom to decide which nation to join.

The native maharaja, or king of Kashmir, first pursued independence since the conquering powers had ignored the region for ages. In the end, though, he consented to join India in return for assistance against the invading herdsmen from Pakistan.

After that, India assumed responsibility for the area’s defence and started the 1947–1948 Indo-Pakistani War. The Karachi Agreement of 1949 called for a referendum in the region but none was held. Instead, it established a line of cease-fire that was monitored by UN military observers.

A border skirmish turned into a full-fledged war in 1965 as tensions continued to simmer. In 1971, the countries again engaged in a brief war, over East Pakistan, with Indian forces aiding the region’s independence. This was followed by the 1972 Shimla Agreement.

The Shimla Agreement created the Line of Control (LOC), a temporary military control line that divided Kashmir into two administrative zones. With this, India and Pakistan sought to usher in a new era of bilateral relations. However, as both powers produced nuclear weapons in the ensuing decades, the war assumed a new dimension and the risks of any confrontation increased.

Tensions were rekindled in 1989 by a growing resistance movement in Indian-administered Kashmir, that was backed by Pakistan, sparking decades of intercommunal violence. The Kargil War began in 1999 when Pakistani soldiers crossed the line of control, despite signing of Lahore Declaration earlier that year.

3.2 2001-2016

While there has been a tenuous cease-fire between the two nations since 2003, they continue to exchange gunfire across the disputed border on a daily basis. Both sides assert that they are shooting in retaliation for attacks and accuse one another of breaking the cease-fire. A surge in border clashes that started in late 2016 and persisted until 2018 resulted in the deaths of numerous people and the displacement of thousands of residents on both sides of the Line of Control.

In 2014, there were expectations that Modi’s government will pursue serious peace talks with Pakistan after the then-newly elected Indian prime minister, Modi, invited Nawaz Sharif, the prime minister of Pakistan, to his inauguration in 2014. After a brief moment of hope, though, things soured again in August same year, when India called off talks with Pakistan’s foreign minister following a meeting between the Pakistani high commissioner in India and leaders of the Kashmiri separatist movement.

Year 2015 saw a number of openings, including an impromptu gathering in December on the fringes of the UN Climate Change Conference in Paris. A few days later, national security advisors met in Bangkok to address the Kashmir dispute as a result of this. The first visit by an Indian leader to Pakistan in over ten years occurred later in December when Prime Minister Modi made an unexpected trip to Lahore to meet with Prime Minister Sharif. This showed the new government’s ability to take ‘big political risks’ for making India-Pakistan relations better.

3.3 2016-2024

While the prospects of India Pakistan relations looked promising, when the armed militants attacked a remote Indian Army post in Uri, close to the Line of Control, in September 2016, the momentum for substantive discussions was lost. It was the bloodiest attack on the Indian armed forces in decades, killing eighteen Indian soldiers. Indian officials said that the incident was carried out by Jamish-e-Mohammad, a group purportedly connected to Pakistan’s primary intelligence organization, the Inter-Services Intelligence. The Pakistani military denied that any such operation had occurred. Later in September 2016, the Indian military declared that it had conducted “surgical strikes” on terrorist camps within Pakistani-controlled territory across the Line of Control.

The policy of ‘surgical strikes’ marked a fundamental shift in India’s approach towards Pakistan sending the strong message of zero tolerance towards terror attacks. Not only this, India also boycotted the 2016 SAARC summit scheduled in Pakistan and was supported by Bangladesh, Bhutan and Afghanistan. This boycott secluded Pakistan as India started focusing and promoting BIMSTEC whose leaders were also invited to the BRICS outreach summit in Goa in 2016.

In October 2017, militants attacked an Indian paramilitary camp close to Srinagar; in February 2018, they attacked an Indian army base in the Jammu region, killing five troops and one civilian. These assaults coincided with a spike in cross-border shelling along the Line of Control, with over 3,000 documented breaches in 2017 and close to 1,000 in the first half of 2018. Over three hundred people were killed in attacks and riots in 2017 as a result of violent protests and demonstrations against India that demanded an independent Kashmir. These protests also included demonstrations against Indian security forces.

India declared in May 2018 that it will observe a cease-fire in Kashmir throughout the month of Ramadan for the first time in nearly two decades; activities resumed in June 2018 following months of Indian military operations targeting both Kashmiri terrorists and protestors. India and Pakistan reached an agreement in May 2018 to reinstate the parameters of their 2003 cease-fire along the disputed Kashmir border.

In 2019, India suffered another attack in the Pulwama district of Jammu and Kashmir, this time too it responded with Balakot airstrike. The airstrike was seen as an attempt by the Modi administration to reinterpret the level of deterrence that exists between Pakistan and India. India also had global sentiments on its side and it geared up its diplomatic efforts to get JeM chief Masood Azhar branded as a global terrorist. The progress was marked by China lifting its veto on the same.

Further in August 2019, India gave Pakistan a jolt by announcing the abrogation of Article 370. The state of Jammu and Kashmir was divided into two union territories; Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh. And when New Delhi invited the BIMSTEC leaders for Modi’s swearing-in ceremony in May 2019, it marked a clear shift in India’s neighbourhood diplomacy.

During the May 2023 Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in India, missing an opportunity to strengthen ties, the foreign ministers of India and Pakistan hurled jabs about Kashmir. In addition, the recent military’s actions against Imran Khan, and the ongoing struggle for power, have sparked worries that political unrest in Pakistan could strengthen the claims made by Indian hardliners and obstruct peace efforts.

3.4 Operation Sindoor (May 2025)

In April-May 2025, India Pakistan experienced heightened tensions following a significant terrorist attack and subsequent military actions.

On April 22, five armed terrorists attacked tourists in valley near Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir, resulting in 26 civilian deaths and 20 injuries. The Resistance Front (TRF), linked to Lashkar-e-Taiba, claimed responsibility of the attacks. The assailants reportedly targeted victims based on religion, marking one of the deadliest attacks on civilians in India since 2008.

In retaliation, India launched Operation Sindoor on May 7, conducting airstrikes on nine terrorist sites in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. These strikes, executed within 22 minutes, targeted infrastructure associated with groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and Hizbul Mujahideen, resulting in the elimination of over 100 terrorists, including senior leaders.

In retaliation, Pakistan attempted drone and missile attacks targeting Indian military installations in Jammu and Kashmir. However, India’s integrated air defence systems successfully intercepted these threats. Subsequently, India expanded its military response, targeting Pakistani airbases and radar installations.

India also suspended the Indus Waters Treaty, asserting its rights over river waters, and ceased trade and visa services with Pakistan.

A ceasefire was established on May 10 through direct military communication between India and Pakistan. It was also remarked by the Indian side that “any future act of terrorism originating in Pakistan will be seen as an act of war by India”.

Regional and Global Repercussions

India’s decisive actions have been viewed as a strategic shift, challenging Pakistan’s reliance on nuclear deterrence and setting a new precedent in counter-terrorism. Internationally, India’s relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan have strained due to their support for Pakistan, leading to calls for boycotts of Turkish Airlines and other measures.

Going ahead, this assertiveness will prompt Western nations, including the United States, to reassess their diplomatic engagements with India. While the U.S. has traditionally viewed India as an ideal swing state, New Delhi’s unilateral actions underscore its intent to act independently when national interests are at stake. Such a stance may lead to recalibrations in bilateral relations in the long term.

As of May 23, 2025, the ceasefire remains in effect, with both nations engaging in diplomatic dialogues to prevent further escalation. India continues to assert its stance against terrorism, emphasizing the need for accountability and regional stability.

4. Treaties between India and Pakistan

4.1 Karachi Declaration

The Karachi Agreement of 1949 aimed to establish a ceasefire line in the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir, effectively bringing an end to the first Indo-Pakistani War that had erupted following the partition of British India in 1947.

4.2 Liaquat-Nehru Pact

A bilateral agreement between India and Pakistan on the rights of minorities and refugees is known as the Liaquat-Nehru Pact, sometimes known as the Delhi Pact. Prime Ministers Jawaharlal Nehru of India and Liaquat Ali Khan of Pakistan signed it on April 8, 1950. To help the minorities in both the Nations, Minority Commissions were being set up according to this Pact. Aside from that, individuals who relocated to another nation were permitted to come back and dispose of whatever belongings they could have left behind, and following this agreement, forced religious conversions were no longer acknowledged.

4.3 Indus Water Treaty

The Indus Water Treaty, signed in 1960 between India and Pakistan, allocates the control and usage of the waters of the Indus River system. Brokered by the World Bank, it divides the six major rivers between the two countries. India has control over the eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej), while Pakistan has control over the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab), facilitating the utilization of waters for irrigation, hydropower, and other purposes while mitigating potential conflicts over water resources.

On backdrop of April 2025 terror attack on Pahalgam, India has suspended the Indus water treaty. Remarking “water and blood can’t flow together,” MEA said that Indus Waters Treaty will remain suspended until Pakistan permanently stops supporting cross-border terrorism

4.4 Tashkent Declaration

The Tashkent Declaration, signed on January 10, 1966, aimed to restore peace between India and Pakistan following the 1965 war.  It was brokered by the Soviet Union and mediated by Alexei Kosygin, the Premier of the Soviet Union, and Ayub Khan, the President of Pakistan, and Lal Bahadur Shastri, the Prime Minister of India. It included provisions for a ceasefire, withdrawal of forces, and peaceful resolution of disputes. Both nations agreed not to alter the ceasefire line in Kashmir unilaterally and pledged to resume diplomatic relations. While it temporarily eased tensions, underlying issues persisted, leading to subsequent conflicts between the two nations.

4.5 Shimla Agreement

The Shimla Agreement, signed on July 2, 1972, between India and Pakistan, aimed to normalize relations after the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. It outlined principles for peaceful resolution of disputes, including the Kashmir conflict. Both nations agreed to respect the Line of Control in Kashmir, facilitate the return of prisoners of war, and promote bilateral relations through dialogue and cooperation. While it temporarily reduced tensions, longstanding issues between India and Pakistan persisted, hindering lasting peace.

Prime ministers of both the nations, that is, Indira Gandhi of India and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan mutually agreed to the terms of the treaty.

4.6 Non-Nuclear Aggression Agreement

The goal of the agreement, which was signed on December 21, 1988, by Prime Ministers Rajiv Gandhi of India and Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan, was to lessen the fear of nuclear attacks on each other’s installations.

In an agreement, both countries pledged never to target the nuclear installations of another country. In this way, it created a secure atmosphere and lessened the fear of any surprise attack.

Following this agreement, neither of the two countries was allowed to harm the nuclear installations or infrastructure of the other.

4.7 Lahore Declaration

The Lahore Declaration was signed on February 21, 1999, by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee of India and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan during Vajpayee’s historic bus journey to Lahore, Pakistan. The declaration aimed to build confidence and promote peace between India and Pakistan by addressing various bilateral issues. Despite the optimism surrounding the Lahore Declaration, it was soon overshadowed by the Kargil conflict in May-July 1999, which strained relations between India and Pakistan. However, the Lahore Declaration remains significant as a symbol of the potential for peace and cooperation between the two nuclear-armed neighbours.

4.8 Kartarpur corridor

The Kartarpur Corridor is a border crossing between India and Pakistan, connecting the Sikh holy shrine of Gurudwara Darbar Sahib Kartarpur in Pakistan to the Dera Baba Nanak shrine in the Indian state of Punjab. It was inaugurated on November 9, 2019, to mark the 550th birth anniversary of Guru Nanak Dev, the founder of Sikhism. The corridor allows Sikh pilgrims from India to visit the Kartarpur Sahib Gurudwara in Pakistan without needing a visa. It serves as a significant symbol of religious harmony and facilitates easier access for Sikh devotees to a revered site.

5. India Pakistan Disputed Territories

5.1 Kashmir issue.

Since independence, the Kashmir issues has remained a bone of contention between India and Pakistan. The dispute also involves other actors, including China. China have not only occupied the parts of Indian territory in Ladakh, Pakistan have also illegally transferred the part of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) to China. Further, because of its strategic location, major powers like USA and Russia also have stakes in Kashmir. It is also believed that even if Kashmir issue is resolved, India Pakistan rivalry will not end. Since, the actual battle is not for land, it is a battle of identities.

5.2 Gilgit Baltistan Issue

At the time of independence, Gilgit Baltistan was under the British rule. On the eve of partition, British officials posted in Gilgit Baltistan raised Pakistan’s flag and when Pakistan occupied the Kashmir, (PoK region), Gilgit Baltistan region also remained on its side. While administratively controlled by Pakistan, Gilgit-Baltistan has never been formally integrated into the Pakistani state and does not have a constitutional status.

Since it does not have any constitutional status, there is no proper administration. The region is also inhabited by Shia sect of Muslims, and the population often faces human rights issue in Sunni dominated Pakistan.

5.3 Siachen Glacier

The Siachen Glacier is important due to its strategic location. At present, the region is under Indian control and the Indian forces are in advantageous situation. Unlike other parts of Jammu & Kashmir, Siachen has been a no man’s land because of geographical conditions. Thus, the Line of Control was not extended to this region. Thus, beyond the northernmost point of the Line of Control, known as NJ9842, Siachen Glacier starts.

In 1984, Pakistan started giving visas to the foreign tourists wanting to visit Siachen Glacier. In response, Indian Air Force conducted operation Meghdoot and occupied the strategic heights. Scholars like Stephen P Cohen, have criticized this fight, suggesting that “fighting for Siachen is like to bald persons fighting for a comb.” Former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh wanted to make Siachen, a mountain of peace. He proposed joint explorations. However, the Indian army is against the resolution. India’s current position is: 1) Demarcate the boundary. 2) Delineate and 3) Demilitarize. On the other hand, Pakistan wants first India to demilitarize the region.

5.4 Sir Creek Region

Prior to independence, Sir Creek was a dispute between State of Sindh and State of Kachchh. Since Sindh became the part of Pakistan, Pakistan lays down the claim of the state.

India adopts Thalweg principle – division of water bodies from the middle. This will put sir creek under India. Pakistan does not accept Thalweg principle because it is meant for navigable waters and it is a marshy land. India says that it becomes navigable during high time. As per 1914’s British map Sir Creek is part of Pakistan’s territory and as per 1925 map it is part of India.

6. Scholarly Perspectives on India Pakistan

Rajesh Basrur in Oxford Handbook of India’s foreign policy has analysed the approach of different prime ministers to Pakistan.

Pandit Nehru argued that Pakistan’s economy, geography and destiny are all linked to India. He always believed that Pakistan will eventually come back to India. Thus, he never considered it as a challenge. It is argued that this idealistic approach of Nehru led him to sign ‘Indus water treaty agreement’ which is highly unfavourable to India.

If Nehru’s approach was idealistic, Indira Gandhi’s approach was realist. However, even Indira Gandhi was not an expert in international politics. 1971 war is a military victory but one of the biggest diplomatic defeats of India. India got nothing in return, except the empty promise that Kashmir issue will be resolved by talks in a bilateral framework.

Rajiv Gandhi’s policies were continuation of Indira Gandhi’s approach.

Gujral doctrine – Gujral’s doctrine can be thought as much well thought gesture of India. PM Gujral made huge investments in improving relations with South Asian neighbours. Within very short time, there was a significant improvement and relaxation of tensions. India and Pakistan agreed for visa liberalization for students and patients.

Vajpayee understood the compulsion of improvement of the relations with neighbours. In his own words, “we can choose our friends, but we cannot choose our neighbours. We can change history but we cannot change geography.” However, Vajpayee’s policies were also inconsistent. It was Vajpayee who decided to go nuclear.This resulted into 1) extreme deterioration in the security situation for India, 2) legitimation of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and 3) opportunity for nuclear blackmail.

Under US pressure, Vajpayee went for bus diplomacy. It resulted into Lahore declaration 1999. Lahore declaration ended in Kargil, which shows the failure of India’s deterrence. Major war could have been averted only with the involvement of US and China.

Manmohan Singh – PM Manmohan Singh also took keen interest in normalization of relations with Pakistan. He focused no economic diplomacy, and one of his major agenda was to get MFN status from Pakistan. There was opening of cross LoC trade. Unfortunately, the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks derailed the composite dialogue. Clear lines were drawn. No talks with terror.

PM Narendra Modi – The govt. started with neighbourhood first policy. Modi invited Nawaz Sharif to oath taking ceremony. He also took some unusual steps like halting at Pakistan while returning from Afghanistan. However, Modi could not remain consistent. After Pathankot and Uri attacks, govt. abandoned the engagement and started isolation. There have been occasions when decisions were taken to restart the dialogue but at the same time dialogues were called off.

Modi govt. tried to pursue the ‘Doval doctrine’. It denotes offensive defence. The Doval doctrine denotes working on Pakistan’s vulnerabilities. Speak in the language Pakistan understands. The use of money, weapons, non-state actors, Balochistan card, Gilgit Baltistan issue and use India’s leverage in Indus Water Treaty.

Stephen P Cohen

In his book Shooting for a Century, Stephen Cohen calls India Pakistan conflict as ‘paired minority conflict’ which has reached to the mutually hurting stalemate. The only other examples of such rivalry are Jewish and Arabs, Tamil and Sinhalese, Shias and Sunnis. Mutually hurting stalemate means present situation is such that one party cannot lose and other party cannot win. According to him, India Pakistan relations may not become normal for another 25 years. They will continue to shoot at each other for at least 100 years before they realize the futility.

M K Narayanan

An ex-diplomat and former National Security Advisor, MK Narayanan suggests that India’s policy towards Pakistan has been a bundle of inconsistent and irrational options. India has the long-term goal of restoring the geographical unity of the subcontinent. Pakistan, on the other hand understands India’s end game and hence does not allow India to pursue its ambitions.

He calls India’s policy towards Pakistan as Yo-Yo diplomacy, which keeps swinging between extremes. Thus, we need new thinking. India should explore the option of cyber war, and must evolve a new counter-force doctrine.

Shashi Tharoor

In his book Pax Indica, Shashi Tharoor calls Pakistan as ‘brother enemy’. According to him, there is very limited option India has in dealing with Pakistan bilaterally. India has tried all sorts of diplomacy from bus to cricket, nothing works. Hence, he proposes ‘back-channel diplomacy’. Reaching to the countries which have leverage on Pakistan. e.g. USA, Saudi Arabia, UAE.

India should utilize its growing weight in international economy to pressurize donor institutions to put conditionalities on Pakistan to take effective counter terrorism efforts.

India should also utilize its growing political weight at international platforms like United Nations to take effective counter-terrorism measures. India should pressurize the international community for the earliest conclusion of CCIT. (Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism).

The key to Pakistan is maintaining the fundamentals of Indian economy strong. We have to increase the stakes of international community in Indian economy to prevent the terrorist attacks in India.

Last but not least, there is a need to maintain the spirit of India. Pakistan cannot win till the spirit of India exists. The existence of India as a secular country is a biggest defeat to the idea of Pakistan and its existence.

7. Why India Needs to Save Pakistan

7.1 Available Options

There are limited options when it comes to India’s choices while dealing with its neighbour. Unfortunately, India hasn’t even utilized them to their potential. The governments appear to have been stuck between taking populist decisions or trying to fundamentally solve the problem.

The first option available with India is diplomatic engagements. By increasing high-level talks, taking confidence-building measures, by both parties agreeing to put the Kashmir issue in deep freeze, with Pakistan agreeing to control the terrorists within its land and India opening up for trade with Pakistan, the situation can be resolved. However, the chances of success with this method are slim since the elected governments don’t enjoy much power in Pakistan and the vested interests of the military won’t allow for peaceful negotiations.

Declaring a full-scale war against Pakistan and defeating may seem a simple option to many Indians since it is militarily stronger than Pakistan. However, both nations are nuclear powers. And while India’s weapons are under civilian control, the same is not true for Pakistan. In any event, it cannot be trusted not to use nuclear weapons and hence an open war is not an option anymore.

International mediation can be the one approach to improve relations. However, India already had its share of international mediation on the issue of Kashmir when the UN intervened first in 1947. Since then, India has decided to go solo in the matter. And now, when it seeks to become a world leader, it is even less likely to seek international help.

Some scholars, find it easier to put the entire blame of Indo-Pak relations on the internal politics of Pakistan. In the words of Rajesh Basrur “To a significant extent, the future direction of the relationship is beyond India’s control as much depends on events and processes inside Pakistan.” While the statement may have an element of truth, such statements serve no real purpose, except perhaps promoting an inaction.

The approach of present government is also not encouraging with the foreign minister simply not wanting to discuss Pakistan. As Sushant Sareen puts it, “India is dealing with Pakistan less as a policy imperative and more as a pathology.” While this may appeal to the sentiments of people, it also doesn’t serve any real purpose.

It is important to note that, although it is difficult to deal with Pakistan, and even 75 years of diplomatic efforts have not produced any tangible output, we don’t have a choice. As former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee puts it “We can choose our friends, but we cannot choose our neighbours. We can change history but we cannot change geography.”

7.2 The Idea of a Failed Pakistan

While there are many in India who cherish the idea of a failed Pakistan, it getting divided into Pashtun, Baloch, Punjab and Sindh, it is more dangerous than present Pakistan. The country posses 165 nuclear warheads with a maximum missile range of 2750km. With the state collapsing, there is every danger of these weapons falling into the hands of terrorists in the middle east. Such a scenario is not impossible and shying away from it will not defer it.

So, what should worry India more than an insurgent Pakistan is a failed Pakistan. In the words of Professor Atul Kohli, India has a vested interest in the stability of Pakistan. If Pakistan fails, it will be more difficult for India to maintain its security and stability. Or as Professor Amitabh Mattoo puts it, A failed Pakistan would be a nightmare for India. It would be a breeding ground for terrorism and extremism, and it would pose a serious threat to India’s security.

7.3 Significance of Improved Relations

We cannot expect much from Pakistan as a nation. But because the stakes are high for India, it needs to do more. And there is also a lot to gain from cooperation with our neighbour. As Ramchandra Guha puts it. “The India-Pakistan relationship is a tragedy. Two countries with so much in common, so much potential, and so much to offer the world are locked in a cycle of conflict. It is time for the two countries to break this cycle and build a new relationship based on peace, cooperation, and understanding.”

We observe from history that the political stability in a region contributes to economic and cultural prosperity. The progress of the post-war EU and recently the ASEAN are excellent examples of this. The improved Indo-Pak relations will mitigate the arms race between nations. It will reduce the need for the military of both nations to ever remain in alert mode. This will not only save economic resources but also valuable human resources which are deployed in the region.

The nations share the history of more than 3000 years. Their geographies are also similar, and there is enormous potential for trade, investment, tourist and cultural exchanges. The cooperation will also ensure energy security in the region through better management of hydropower and pushing forward the stalled gas pipeline for India.

Peaceful relations will improve the connectivity in the region, giving access to Central Asia for India and perhaps India’s no-objection to China Pakistan Economic Corridor. The cooperation between governments will also ensure that transnational issues like drug trafficking, organized crime, money laundering etc. are resolved for the betterment of both nations.

7.4 The Only Problem

The biggest problem that still remains unaddressed is – how to save Pakistan and save ourselves in the process. There is no denying that Pakistan is failing. Its debts are at all-time high & foreign reserves low. Democracy is in peril, more than ever. The judiciary, which appeared strong in the recent past, is again looking weak. While Imran Khan’s regime looks promising, he’s no longer in charge, rather facing multiple charges in court and has recently escaped an assassination attempt.

While India can make economic progress without Pakistan, it can never achieve its true potential in this manner. As Atul Kohli puts it, the fate of India and Pakistan are like two ships tied together. If one ship sinks, the other ship will sink too. It is in the interest of both countries to work together to ensure that neither ship sinks.

8. Conclusion

Conflicts like that of India-Pakistan are intractable in the short term. Restoring one or both parties’ confidence will take time and effort before they can interact with one another in a realistic manner. The unwillingness to compromise is a basic issue in these disputes. You see yourself going down the slippery slope of making more compromises if you perceive yourself as a minority that is under attack and is compelled to do so. Pakistan or India wants to retreat if it believes that it is giving in more than the other.

There have been brief times in the past when the two nations’ relationship was balanced and neither felt threatened by the other. Nevertheless, this equilibrium vanished rapidly after perhaps a day, a week, or a month. And as soon as the equilibrium phase is over, both parties feel threatened once more, and the agreements made earlier are broken.

The most difficult problems can be handled if the two nations can review and amend their revisionist policies and stance and take concrete steps to increase mutual confidence. To do this, nevertheless, both governments will need to reshape state nationalism, reposition institutional mindsets, and rework on hostile populism. This may seem too far-fetched, but may be the only practical solution for two hostile nuclear-neighbours.

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