Abhijeet Pimparkar1] The Cold War
A] Origins and Causes
The Cold War was a protracted geopolitical and ideological rivalry between the United States (and its allies) and the Soviet Union (and its satellites) following World War II. However, even before WWII ended, mutual suspicions ran deep.
The U.S., emerging as a global power, was determined to prevent any rival from dominating Eurasia, while the USSR’s was bent upon security-driven expansion in Eastern Europe. Ideologically, the United States championed liberal capitalism, and the Soviet Union promoted communism – each viewing the other’s system as a threat to its way of life. Winston Churchill famously warned in 1946 of an “iron curtain” descending across Europe, dividing the free West from the communist East.
Thus, we can say that several early events cemented the Cold War divide:
1] Soviet Actions in Eastern Europe
As Nazi Germany fell, Stalin’s forces occupied Eastern Europe and installed pro-Soviet regimes. This suggested an expanding communist sphere.
In response, the U.S. adopted containment as its grand strategy. The 1946 Long Telegram by U.S. diplomat George Kennan (alias “Mr. X”) advised that the USSR viewed itself in perpetual conflict with capitalism and could only be met with “patient, vigilant containment”.
In 1947, with the Truman Doctrine, President Harry S. Truman established that the United States would provide political, military and economic assistance to all democratic nations under threat from external or internal authoritarian forces.
Further, the Marshall Plan (1948) proposed that the United States provide economic assistance to restore the economic infrastructure of postwar Europe. Under the initiative, billions of dollars were injected to rebuild (West) European economies – both to create a bulwark against communism and to expand U.S. influence. This linked Europe to the U.S. through trade and also made the dollar a global currency.
Although offered participation, the Soviet Union refused Plan benefits and also blocked benefits to Eastern Bloc countries. It came up with its own economic bloc (COMECON).
In addition to above developments, NATO was formed in April 1949 and the U.S. monopoly on atomic bombs ended when the USSR tested its first atomic weapon in August 1949, intensifying security fears. The U.S. proposal for international control of atomic energy (the Baruch Plan, 1946) failed as the Soviets countered that the U.S. must disarm first. A nuclear arms race was underway (discussed later), which paradoxically would enforce caution: as theorist Kenneth Waltz observed, these superweapons “made Cold War cold” by deterring direct superpower war.
2] Who Was Responsible?
The blame for the Cold War still remains debated. Traditionalists argue Soviet aggression and expansionism caused the breakdown of relations. Revisionists fault the U.S., noting that Washington’s drive for global markets and its aggressive policies (Truman Doctrine, NATO formation, etc.) provoked Soviet insecurity. Post-revisionists conclude that both sides contributed – an inevitable clash of two security-conscious superpowers whose interests and ideologies were incompatible.
Realists even suggest the conflict was structural: a power vacuum after WWII left two dominant states whose geopolitical imperatives doomed cooperation. In contrast, social constructivists contend the Cold War was not preordained – it resulted from mutual misperceptions and distrust that, with better diplomacy, might have been overcome.
B] Phases of the Cold War
Although “Cold” (no large-scale direct combat between the superpowers), the rivalry had distinct phases of intensity:
1] Early Confrontation (late 1940s–1950s)
As the Iron Curtain solidified in Europe, the U.S. led the formation of NATO in 1949. The Soviets responded in 1955 by organizing the Warsaw Pact with their Eastern European satellites, formalizing a bipolar military standoff. In this, Germany became a focal point. The Berlin Wall was constructed in 1961 and stood as the Cold War’s stark symbol until its fall in 1989.
During this period, the U.S. and USSR also competed for influence in the decolonizing Third World, For example, the Korean War (1950–53). In 1954, U.S. President Eisenhower articulated the Domino Theory, fearing if one country fell to communism, neighbours would follow. This rationale dragged the U.S. into Vietnam, where it waged a costly war (1955–1975) to prevent a communist takeover.
2] Height of Tensions (early 1960s)
The early ’60s brought the world perilously close to nuclear war. After the failed U.S.-backed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba (1961) and amidst American attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro, the Soviet Union in 1962 secretly deployed nuclear missiles to Cuba.
The resulting Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962) was the Cold War’s most dangerous showdown – a 13-day confrontation that brought humanity to the brink of nuclear catastrophe. Ultimately, a deal was struck: the USSR withdrew the missiles, and the U.S. pledged not to invade Cuba (and secretly agreed to remove U.S. missiles from Turkey).
3] Détente (late 1960s–1970s)
The mid-1960s through the 1970s saw a relative thaw. Détente, a French term for easing tensions, described the improved U.S.-Soviet relationship after two decades of high conflict. Several factors drove détente: the Cuban crisis shock, the exhausting quagmire of Vietnam (which eroded U.S. hegemony and gold reserves), and the Soviet desire to stabilize its sphere and economy.
In this phase, the key developments included: the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963) banning nuclear tests in atmosphere, outer space and water. ; the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT, opened 1968) to prevent new nuclear states; and the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I, 1972) freezing strategic missile launchers.
Notably, the U.S. also opened relations with communist China (Nixon’s 1972 visit) – a strategic “triangular diplomacy” to exploit the Sino-Soviet split. However, despite rhetoric the phase did not end the rivalry: proxy conflicts continued, and both sides still modernized arsenals. Détente was more a pause than a permanent peace, as events would show.
4] Renewed Confrontation (1979–1985)
Détente collapsed at the end of the 1970s. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 was dubbed the “Brezhnev Doctrine” in action (Moscow’s insistence on controlling its perimeter). The U.S., under President Ronald Reagan, responded with hardline policies. The early 1980s thus saw a “Second Cold War” – high tensions and rhetoric. During this phase, the superpowers engaged in intense proxy wars. The he U.S. armed Islamic mujahideen fighters against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. The toll of the Afghan war, combined with an arms race at a time of economic stagnation, strained the Soviet system severely.
5] Endgame (1985–1991)
A dramatic turnaround came with Mikhail Gorbachev’s rise to power in 1985. Gorbachev sought to reform the Soviet system (through glasnost openness and perestroika restructuring) and realized that easing Cold War tensions was necessary for internal revival.
He engaged in unprecedented summits with U.S. President Reagan, signing the INF Treaty (1987) to eliminate an entire class of medium-range nuclear missiles. Gorbachev also announced the “Sinatra Doctrine,” letting Warsaw Pact states “do it their way”.
The result was swift: in 1989, communist regimes collapsed across Eastern Europe (the Berlin Wall fell in November 1989, symbolizing the Cold War’s demise). Gorbachev refused to send in Soviet tanks to stop these revolutions.
The Cold War formally ended with the Malta Summit in December 1989, where Gorbachev and U.S. President George H.W. Bush declared an end to hostilities. By December 1991, the Soviet Union was dissolved into 15 independent states, marking the end of the bipolar era.
6] Global Developments During the Cold War
Despite the superpower standoff, the period saw transformative global changes during Cold War. The colonial empires in Asia and Africa collapsed – dozens of new nation-states emerged as the European powers withdrew. These newly independent countries often became pawns or players in the Cold War. Many joined the India led Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to avoid choosing sides. The Cold War’s pressures also accelerated European integration in the West (culminating in the European Economic Community, the precursor to today’s EU) as Western Europe sought unity and strength under U.S. protection. Technological competition surged – the superpowers’ space race put Sputnik and then Apollo astronauts into space, dramatically advancing science and technology. Culturally, the rivalry shaped everything from Olympic sports to art and propaganda.
C] Consequences of the Cold War
The 45-year conflict left a profound imprint on international order:
Nuclear Arms Race and Arms Control: The superpowers amassed tens of thousands of nuclear warheads, leading to a precarious balance of terror (MAD – Mutually Assured Destruction). This arms race spurred the creation of global arms control regimes (NPT, SALT, etc.) to prevent catastrophe.
Military Blocs and Militarization: The world divided into rival blocs (NATO vs Warsaw Pact), and even formally neutral states often tilted toward one side or the other. Massive military expenditures were incurred; at one point the USSR devoted an estimated 15–20% of its GDP to defence. This prolonged militarization had negative economic effects – indeed, the Soviet Union’s eventual collapse was partly due to the unsustainable burden of the arms race.
Proxy Wars and Instability in the Developing World: The Third World became a chessboard for proxy conflicts – from Korea and Vietnam to Angola, Afghanistan, and Central America. Many of these wars were devastating for the local populations and left legacies of instability.
Paralysis of the United Nations: The UN Security Council, with both the U.S. and USSR holding vetoes, was often deadlocked and ineffective in major crises. Superpower rivalry stymied collective security except when interests aligned.
Economic and Technological Competition: The Cold War split the world economy. The West experienced unprecedented growth under U.S.-led institutions (IMF, World Bank, GATT), while the Eastern bloc had a closed, centrally planned economy. Technologically, competition (especially the space race and defence research) led to breakthroughs (satellites, computing, etc.), but also huge expenditures on unproductive capacities like warheads.
Stability (the “Long Peace”): Paradoxically, some scholars argue the Cold War imposed a grim stability on great-power relations. With two superpowers checking each other, large-scale wars (like the World Wars) did not recur. Nuclear deterrence forced caution – direct U.S.-Soviet clashes were avoided for fear of Armageddon. As John Lewis Gaddis dubbed it, the post-1945 era was a “Long Peace” among major powers, albeit shadowed by the constant risk of annihilation.
Other consequences: When the Cold War ended, the global landscape changed swiftly. The immediate aftermath was a unipolar world with the United States as the lone superpower. There was optimism about a liberal “New World Order” under U.S. leadership and a reinvigorated UN.
However, some observers note that the end of the East-West ideological clash gave way to Samuel Huntington’s predicted “clash of civilizations” – with cultural and religious conflicts coming to the fore. The 1990s also saw the rise of non-state actors – from terrorist groups like al-Qaeda to multinational corporations – gaining influence in a more interconnected, unipolar world. Meanwhile, the Non-Aligned Movement struggled to redefine itself in a world no longer split between two blocs.
The Cold War shaped the second half of the 20th century profoundly. It set the stage for many of today’s institutions and alliances, left a mixed legacy of technological progress and traumatic conflicts. Understanding its trajectory – and how it ended – is crucial to grasping current debates about whether we are entering a “new Cold War.”
2] Cold War 2.0?
With rising tensions in recent years – marked by a confrontational Russia, an assertive China, and a more protective U.S. stance – it is often argued if a “Cold War 2.0” is emerging. There is no consensus on this term’s applicability. Some argue that today’s rivalries, while serious, differ fundamentally from the original Cold War; others see strong parallels in the hostility between major powers.
A] Views of Stephan Walt
Prominent scholars like Stephen Walt caution that calling current U.S.–Russia tensions a “new Cold War” is misleading. Walt notes that the original Cold War featured two roughly equal superpowers locked in a global ideological and military competition. Today’s context is quite different:
The international system is no longer bipolar but “lopsided multipolar.” The U.S. remains the preeminent power, while Russia is a distant second-tier player and China is an emerging peer competitor. Russia’s economy (about $2 trillion GDP) is dwarfed by America’s (around $27 trillion). If the Cold War was Godzilla vs. King Kong, remarks Walt, the current U.S.-Russia matchup is more Godzilla vs. Bambi.
There is no global ideological binary driving the divide. In the Cold War, liberal democracy and communism were rival ideologies. Today’s Russia does not offer a compelling transnational ideology akin to Soviet communism. The competition is more about geopolitical interests than winning minds.
The confrontation is geographically narrower. U.S.-Russia friction today centers on specific regions – Eastern Europe (e.g. Ukraine), the Middle East (Syria), and cyberspace – not a worldwide contest in every theatre. During the Cold War, conflicts and proxy wars spanned from Asia to Africa to Latin America.
Further, Walt warns that equating today’s situation with the Cold War might risk focusing on the “wrong enemy” – diverting attention from China’s rise. Arguably, larger long-term challenge for Washington is China, not Russia. In effect, the U.S. faces a potential two-front strategic rivalry (with Beijing and Moscow), which is very different from the singular focus it had on Moscow during the Cold War.
He emphasizes that, unlike the ideological and military standoff of the original Cold War, today’s U.S.-China rivalry is characterized by deep economic interdependence, technological competition, and differing visions of global order. Walt contends that both nations have conflicting interests—while the U.S. seeks to uphold a liberal, rules-based international system, China advocates for a Westphalian model emphasizing state sovereignty . He warns that mischaracterizing this competition could lead to policy missteps and unnecessary escalation.
B] Current Global Order
We can characterize the present world as post-post-Cold War: unipolarity has waned, and a more contested multipolarity is emerging. U.S. power is still predominant militarily and in alliances, but it is being challenged regionally by Russia and globally by China. International institutions are still largely Western-designed (UN, Bretton Woods system), yet their efficacy and authority is undermined by rise of parallel institutions.
Still, unlike the rigid blocs of the Cold War, many countries today are non-aligned or multi-aligned. For example, India (discussed later) is courting both the U.S. (for security against China) and Russia (for defence equipment and energy). Turkey is a NATO member yet buys Russian missiles. This underscores that while the great-power competition is real, it is more complex and less all-encompassing than the U.S.-Soviet duel.
Thus, the term “Cold War 2.0” is contested. Stephen Walt and others urge caution, arguing the metaphor may oversimplify and misdirect policy. Alexei Arbatov and similar voices respond that the hostility and distrust in U.S.–Russia relations today do mirror a Cold War climate, albeit in a changed environment.
The risk, of course, is that learning the wrong lessons (either underestimating the dangers or overreacting and creating self-fulfilling prophecies) could make the world more dangerous. As one analyst put it, history may not repeat, but it often rhymes – so careful statecraft is needed to avoid a slide into a more severe confrontation.
3] U.S. Hegemony and Changing Global Order
A] The Rise of U.S. Hegemony
The United States emerged from World War II as the strongest nation on earth – militarily victorious, economically thriving, and possessing a nuclear monopoly. Several long-term factors explain how the U.S. built a position of unprecedented hegemony:
1] Geopolitical Advantages
The U.S. benefited immensely from its geography. Flanked by two oceans and peaceful neighbours, the American homeland was shielded from the devastation that ravaged Europe and Asia in two world wars. This security allowed the U.S. to develop a stable democracy and prosperous economy.
It also meant that when others were exhausted by conflict, the U.S. could intervene decisively. Indeed, the U.S. entered both the world wars late – once other powers were drained – ensuring victory at a lower cost. By 1945, the U.S. stood astride the world as the only major industrial economy not wrecked by bombing or occupation. It produced roughly half of global economic output and had the dominant navy controlling key sea-lanes.
2] Economic and Financial Power
As WWII ended, the U.S. leveraged its economic might to establish a new international financial order (the Bretton Woods system). American loans and aid helped rebuild war-torn regions. The U.S. dollar – backed by vast gold reserves – became the world’s principal reserve currency. The dollar’s central role gave Washington enormous leverage – a point still holds.
3] Military Supremacy and Alliances
The U.S. used its wartime military strength to create a permanent global military presence. After 1945, it established bases across Europe and Asia. USA also built treaty alliances: NATO in 1949 (securing Western Europe), and with Japan, Australia and New-Zealand in Asia.
Through these pacts, the U.S. effectively became the guarantor of security for many regions, stationing troops and committing to defence. This entrenched U.S. leadership over allies (who, as noted, “outsourced” much of their defence to Washington).
4] Ideological Appeal and Leadership
American ideals of freedom, democracy, and open enterprise had wide appeal, especially in contrast to totalitarian fascism or Stalinism. The U.S. presented itself as the champion of a “free world” – a self-image rooted in its concept of “Manifest Destiny” and reinforced by WWII’s outcome.
Culturally, American products, Hollywood films, and later pop music became globally influential, bolstering U.S. soft power. Overall, many societies found aspects of the U.S. model attractive or at least aspirational.
5] Exploiting Rival’s Weaknesses
Additionally, the U.S. benefited greatly from Soviet missteps. American strategists consciously aimed to strain USSR’s– for example, by engaging it in an expensive arms race and keeping energy prices low to sap Soviet revenues.
The cumulative effect was to isolate and bankrupt the Soviet state, making the U.S. “victory” in the Cold War as much about the USSR collapsing under its own weight. As one wry saying has it, the U.S. didn’t win the Cold War so much as the USSR lost it. The outcome left the U.S. standing tall as the sole superpower by 1991.
By the 1990s, American hegemony appeared nearly unchallenged. Political scientist Francis Fukuyama went so far as to dub it “the end of history,” with liberal democracy and U.S.-led order as the final paradigm.
B] Challenges and Decline of U.S. Hegemony
US enjoyed hegemony almost since end of 2nd world war. However, since the late 2000s, commentators have increasingly described U.S. hegemony as in relative decline. Key challenges include:
1] Overextension and War Fatigue
It all started with the events of 9/11. The attacks on American soil in 2001 provoked an immediate and strong response. The U.S. launched the Global War on Terror, beginning with the invasion of Afghanistan to dismantle al-Qaeda and topple the Taliban. However, it soon turned into a long and costly entanglement.
The pursuit of regime change and state-building stretched U.S. resources and global goodwill. Over time, these interventions, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq, exposed the limits of American military power, sapped economic strength, and created a growing perception that U.S. foreign policy was overextended and unsustainable.
2] Economic Constraints
The U.S. suffered serious economic setbacks, notably the 2008 financial crisis, which originated in Wall Street and shook confidence in the American-model of deregulated capitalism. The crisis inflicted lasting damage: sluggish growth and rising debt. Additionally, persistent trade deficits led to industrial decline, fuelling domestic discontent. The COVID-19 pandemic (2020) further hit U.S. prestige, as America’s initially chaotic response contrasted with more efficient actions by others.
3] Rising Powers – China and India
Perhaps the most defining structural challenge is the rise of China. Powered by decades of near-double-digit GDP growth. China used its economic clout to build modern military forces. Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has expanded its influence across Asia, Africa– effectively creating a Sino-centric economic zone. This expansion is reminiscent of the U.S. Marshall Plan and post-war economic leadership, leading some to call China an emerging “hegemon” in its own right.
India, too, is rising, albeit at a slower pace and without much spectacle. India is a civilizational state, perhaps with the longest living history. India’s economy, now the world’s fifth-largest, is growing and its population has surpassed China’s, making it the largest democracy and most populous nation. India has significant military power including nuclear weapons. Above all, India has demonstrated its willingness to use hard power in the recent response to Pakistani terror attacks. It also means that U.S. can no longer take its support for granted.
4] Resurgent Russia
Although far weaker than its Soviet predecessor, Russia under Putin has punched above its weight by exploiting opportunities and weaknesses in Western strategy. Russia’s outright challenge to U.S. hegemony came with the 2008 war in Georgia and especially the 2014 seizure of Crimea from Ukraine. While Russia cannot project power globally as the U.S. can, Russia’s challenge is mostly regional. It does not have the economic base to truly rival the U.S., but it has enough military might (including the world’s largest nuclear arsenal) to demand Washington’s attention.
5] European Autonomy and Global Diffusion of Power
Another subtle challenge to U.S. primacy has come from its own allies. Western Europe, through EU, has become an economic giant and is asserting its distinct interests. Under President Trump (2017–2021), trans-Atlantic relations hit a new low as the U.S. imposed tariffs on European goods, exited the Iran nuclear deal and Paris climate accord. European leaders like Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron publicly stated that Europe must become more self-reliant and cannot always depend on the U.S.
Additionally, Europe and the U.S. differ on how to handle powers like Russia and China. The region has strong trade with both the powers, which often conflict with the US policy. Europe’s sheer economic weight and the euro currency’s role also gives it leverage to challenge U.S. policies, if needed.
The global power distribution is flattening into a more multipolar shape. The challenge for the U.S. is how to navigate a world where it must share power or overextend itself in a futile bid to restore unipolarity.
C] Will China Become a Superpower?
This question is at the heart of the hegemony debate. Many in Washington see China as the principal long-term competitor for USA. If current trajectories continue, its GDP may equal or exceed the U.S. It is rapidly modernizing its military and is asserting leadership in international institutions. China’s BRI investments in some 70 countries buy it influence and secure trade routes. Furthermore, China has started to challenge U.S. hegemony in Asia – for example, militarizing artificial islands in the South China Sea. It has also signalled ambitions in cutting-edge technology of AI and quantum computing, which could translate into strategic advantages.
However, whether China can surpasses the USA is not guaranteed. It faces considerable headwinds: a rapidly aging population, environmental crise, and pushback from other powers wary of Chinese dominance. Moreover, becoming a superpower is not just about raw metrics, but also global leadership and trust. Its handling of the COVID-19 outbreak’s early stages and aggressive “wolf-warrior” diplomacy have harmed its reputation. Beijing often emphasizes non-interference and sovereignty, which but hasn’t yet shown willingness to provide global public goods. If China remains unwilling to take on certain burdens, its superpower status could be limited.
Views of Samir Saran
Dr. Samir Saran, and author of Pax Sinica: Implications for the Indian Dawn, offers a nuanced critique of China’s aspirations to superpower status. He highlights several structural and strategic limitations that impede the rise of China.
1. Fragile Political Structure: Dr. Saran points out that China’s centralized political system, characterized by the concentration of power in the Communist Party and the absence of democratic institutions, fosters internal insecurity. This brittleness within its polity undermines the stability required for sustained global leadership.
2. Lack of Soft Power: Despite its economic prowess, China struggles to project soft power effectively. Its cultural and political models have limited appeal globally, and its assertive foreign policies often alienate other nations. This deficiency hampers China’s ability to build the international alliances and goodwill necessary for superpower status.
3. Economic and Technological Challenges: China’s rapid economic growth faces headwinds, including an aging population, environmental degradation, and the challenges of transitioning from manufacturing to innovation-driven industries. Additionally, its technological advancements are often viewed with suspicion, leading to pushback from other countries concerned about security and intellectual property issues.
4. Global Perception and Trust Deficit: Dr. Saran emphasizes that China’s global image suffers due to its handling of international issues, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and territorial disputes. The lack of transparency and aggressive diplomacy contribute to a trust deficit, making other nations wary of China’s intentions and reducing its influence on the world stage.
5. Resistance from Other Powers: China’s rise is met with resistance from established and emerging powers. Along with USA, India and members of the EU are strengthening their own strategic positions to counterbalance China’s assertiveness. It limits Chinese ability to unilaterally shape global norms and institutions.
Dr. Saran argues that while China has made significant strides economically and militarily, these achievements are insufficient for true superpower status without corresponding reforms and trust-building. The combination of internal vulnerabilities and external resistance suggests that China’s path to becoming a global superpower is fraught with challenges.
4] Arms Race
An arms race is a competitive buildup of military capabilities between states (or groups of states), each seeking security or advantage by outpacing the other. Throughout history, arms races have been a recurring phenomenon – from the naval arms race between Britain and Germany before World War I to the nuclear arms race of the Cold War. They are driven by the security dilemma: one state’s attempt to increase its security (by arming) makes others feel less secure, prompting them to arm in response, leading to a spiral of accumulation.
A] Pros and Cons of Arms Races
Arms races are often viewed negatively, as they can be wasteful and heighten the risk of war. Competing states pour huge sums into weapons that might never be used except to deter each other. This diverts resources from social needs; for developing countries, importing arms can accumulate debt without productive payoff. The Soviet Union’s economic difficulties in the 1980s were “certainly exacerbated” by the very high share of GDP devoted to the arms race with the U.S.. Additionally, when adversaries rapidly arm, mistrust deepens, making diplomatic solutions harder.
There is debate on whether arms races cause war. Intuitively, arms buildups create fear and worst-case assumptions; However, it may also be the case that underlying rivalry lead to both arms races and war, rather than the arms race itself triggering a war.
On contrary, arms race can also be a deterrent to war. For example, the Cold War nuclear arms race did not lead to direct superpower war – arguably because the fear of what those arms could do (mutual annihilation) acted as a brake on aggression.
Thus, some scholars argue arms races under certain conditions can stabilize a rivalry by ensuring deterrence. This was essentially Waltz’s view: nuclear arms, by raising the cost of war unimaginably high, kept the peace between the U.S. and USSR.
In contrast, conventional arms races lack that absolute deterrence and may encourage one side to strike first if it believes it has gained a temporary edge.
Economically, arms spending can have some short-term benefits like job creation in defence industries or push technological innovation. But beyond a point, it’s a zero-sum game if rivals just offset each other. Nations not only risk bankrupting themselves (as the USSR effectively did), but also if they “win” the race by causing an opponent’s collapse (like the U.S. vis-à-vis USSR), they might inherit new problems, e.g. in Indo Pak arms race, Pak is essentially turning towards a failed state and there is grave danger of nuclear weapons falling in hands of non-state actors. Thus, arms control is generally seen as desirable to avoid unchecked arms races, but it requires mutual trust, hard to come by between adversaries.
B] Arms Races Today
The end of the Cold War briefly raised hopes of a “peace dividend” and an end to arms racing. Indeed, military budgets dropped in the 1990s and the total number of nuclear weapons worldwide fell by over 75% from Cold War highs. However, the 21st century has seen a reemergence of arms competition on multiple fronts:
1] U.S.–Russia
In 2019, the U.S. (under Trump) left the INF Treaty, accusing Russia of violating it with a new intermediate-range cruise missile. The last remaining pact, New START (2010), limits deployed strategic warheads to 1,550 each and was extended to 2026; but its future is uncertain, especially after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Both countries are modernizing their nuclear triads – the U.S. with a planned $1.2 trillion, 30-year overhaul, and Russia with new ICBMs, nuclear-powered cruise missiles, and upgraded nuclear submarines etc. While numbers are far below Cold War levels, the emphasis is now on quality and diversification of nuclear systems. The danger is a new arms race in destabilizing technologies, with reduced transparency.
2] Multipolar Nuclear Competition
During the Cold War, the U.S. and USSR tried to constrain nuclear proliferation – hence treaties like the NPT. Still, other countries acquired nukes: Britain, France, and China, and outside the NPT, Israel, India, South Africa (which later dismantled its arsenal), and Pakistan all developed weapons. Post–Cold War, North Korea joined the nuclear club (first test in 2006).
Today regional arms races exist: India and Pakistan have an action-reaction cycle in South Asia, with India’s larger military spurring Pakistan to develop nuclear tactical weapons and increase its warhead count. India’s quest for a credible nuclear triad – it has deployed its first ballistic missile submarine, the INS Arihant) and advanced delivery systems (like the Agni-V ICBM) is partly driven by China’s arsenal, not just Pakistan.
Meanwhile, China’s nuclear expansion has accelerated; it is “fast developing short and medium range missiles” and moving toward a larger deterrent, perhaps aiming for 1000 warheads by 2030. This means a trilateral nuclear arms competition (U.S.-Russia-China) is emerging, which is harder to manage since Cold War arms control was bilateral.
Thus, we face a multipolar nuclear arms race: three great powers modernizing arsenals, plus regional players adding capabilities. This raises complexities – e.g. U.S. missile defences built against North Korea also worry China and Russia; India’s buildup to deter China affects Pakistan’s sense of security, and so on.
3] Advanced Arms and Technology
While the U.S. has maintained a lead in conventional weapons, others are catching up or pioneering new areas. For instance, anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) have been tested by the U.S., Russia, China, and India – raising the prospect of a race to weaponize space. Cyber warfare capabilities are a major new arena, though harder to quantify as an “arms race,” nations are certainly in a race for cyber offensive and defensive prowess. Artificial Intelligence and autonomous weapons (e.g. drone swarms) could also become a race if countries believe AI will confer a military edge. Unlike nukes, these areas currently lack arms control regimes, so it’s a free-for-all.
4] Global Military Spending
After a post-Cold War low in the 1990s, global military expenditure has steadily risen and now exceeds Cold War levels in constant dollars.
The United States still far outspends any other, larger than the next 9 countries combined. China’s military budget has increased more than tenfold since 1990. India and others have also increased spending. Regions like East Asia are now engaged in an arms buildup.
While the Cold War arms race is over, we now have a complex set of arms races – more regional and multi-dimensional. They involve not just two superpowers but multiple actors and technologies. The lessons of the past suggest that arms races, if left unchecked, can lead to insecurity spirals and potentially war by miscalculation. Conversely, the Cold War also showed that diplomacy can mitigate arms races. The challenge today is achieving agreements in a more fragmented power structure, and on new frontiers of warfare, before competition escalates into conflict.
5] The Nuclear Question
Ever since atomic bombs were first used in 1945, the world has grappled with the nuclear question: Why do nations acquire nuclear weapons and what are the implications for international security? This topic has inspired a rich body of theory, from realist arguments about deterrence to liberal emphasis on institutions to constructivist focus on norms.
A] Why Nations Acquire Nuclear Weapons
1] Security
The most straightforward purpose is to deter existential threats. Realist scholars argue states seek nukes when they face a significant security challenge. For example, the Soviet Union pursued nukes to negate the U.S. advantage; Britain and France developed them to ensure an independent deterrent. China did so after facing both U.S. and Soviet pressure in the 1960s.
In more recent times, India’s nuclear quest was driven by security concerns vis-à-vis China (after Indo China 1962 war and Chinese nuclear test of 1964) and later Pakistan, while Pakistan’s program was a direct response to India’s nuclear tests.
Israel is believed to have built nukes to guarantee its survival against numerically superior Arab neighbours. North Korea offers a textbook case: facing the U.S. military presence in South Korea and hostile regional environment, it saw nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor against regime change.
2] Prestige and Status
Nukes can confer a sense of great-power status. France’s Charles de Gaulle famously said that “nuclear weapons were necessary for France to count in world affairs”. Emerging powers may see them as tickets to the top table. It relates to the idea that with nuclear capability comes more influence or at least insurance of sovereignty.
3] Other Factors
Scholars like Scott Sagan point out that military-scientific bureaucracies can also push for nuclear acquisition.
Further,if a country loses faith that its ally’s nuclear umbrella will protect it, it might seek its own bomb. Today, some speculate that if U.S. security guarantees to countries like South Korea or Turkey waver, those countries might contemplate nuclear options themselves.
B] Why Nations Give Up or Refrain from Nuclear Weapons:
1] Assurances and Alliances
Many countries capable of developing nukes chose not to because they rely on allies. States like Japan, South Korea, and Australia live under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, removing their need to proliferate.
2] International Norms and Pressure
The NPT created a strong non-proliferation norm. Countries that considered the bomb often faced global opprobrium and sanctions (e.g., South Africa in the apartheid era, or more recently Iran). Nina Tannenwald refers to a “nuclear taboo” – a normative inhibition not just on use but even on brandishing nuclear weapons as normal instruments of policy. This stigma can deter leaders from pursuing the bomb if they want international acceptance.
3] Cost and Technical Difficulty
Nuclear weapons programs are expensive and technically challenging. Countries need not only fissile material (highly enriched uranium or plutonium) but also know-how for weaponization and delivery systems, which may require years of testing. For smaller economies, this can be a huge burden and divert funds from development.
4] Leadership Decisions
Sometimes individual leaders can make a call to stop nuclear programs due to changing threat perceptions or other considerations. E.g., Libyan leader Gaddafi agreed in 2003 to dismantle nuclear program to normalize relations with the West. However, this example later gave North Korea an opposite lesson when Gaddafi was toppled without a deterrent.
Coercion
In some cases, countries were prevented from getting nukes by outside force or covert action. Iraq’s weapons program was halted by Israel’s 1981 airstrike on Osirak and later by the 1991 Gulf War and UN inspections. Syria’s suspected reactor was bombed by Israel in 2007.
C] Scholarly Views on Nuclear Weapons
1] Kenneth Waltz (Realist, “More May Be Better”)
Waltz contends that nuclear weapons are a force for peace. He argues that when states go nuclear, war… He argues that when states go nuclear, the risk of major war between them plummets because neither will want to court its own destruction.
Fellow realist John Mearsheimer agrees but with a caveat: he supports selective proliferation – believing it’s stabilizing for mature democracies to have nukes, but dangerous in the hands of unstable regimes.
2] Scott D. Sagan (Organizational Theorist)
Sagan strongly contests the nuclear optimism. He argues that while nuclear deterrence in theory makes war irrational, in practice human and organizational failures make nuclear use possible. Military organizations, he notes, have inherent biases and favour offensive doctrines in crises.
Sagan points to historical near-misses (like the Cuban Missile Crisis) as evidence that deterrence has come close to failing – not by deliberate choice of leaders but by misperceptions and military pressure for advantage.
Thus, Sagan concludes there is a significant probability that given enough time and more nuclear actors, deterrence will fail somewhere, resulting in nuclear war or an accident. He therefore advocates strong non-proliferation efforts and tight control of existing arsenals.
3] Nina Tannenwald (Constructivist)
Tannenwald shifts the focus to the power of norms and ethics. She argues that a “nuclear taboo” – an informal but powerful global norm –developed against the use of nuclear weapons. Leaders have come to see nukes as abhorrent options, not just ordinary military tools. This taboo, in her assessment, significantly contributed to the 77-plus year tradition of non-use since 1945.
However, she warns against complacency: just because the worst-case (nuclear war) hasn’t happened yet “does not mean it will not materialize”. If norms erode or states grow careless, we could still “slip into nuclear war because of our carelessness”.
Tannenwald is a proponent of efforts to delegitimize nuclear weapons – for instance, she praises the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (ban treaty) as a grassroots initiative that reframes nukes as unacceptable on humanitarian grounds. Such movements, in her view will strengthen the taboo and push nuclear states toward disarmament over time.
6] Global Nuclear Security Architecture
After the shock of early proliferation, the world developed a series of treaties and institutions to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Below are key components of this nuclear security architecture.
A] NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1968/1970)
Widely considered the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime, the NPT rests on a central bargain with three pillars:
- Non-proliferation – non-nuclear states agree not to acquire nuclear weapons;
- Disarmament – nuclear-armed states (the P5 recognized in the treaty: US, USSR/Russia, UK, France, China) pledge to pursue disarmament;
- Peaceful use – all states can access nuclear technology for energy/medicine under safeguards.
The treaty has 191 state parties (near universal membership). Only five countries are outside it: India, Pakistan, and Israel never joined (each developed nuclear weapons), and North Korea joined but withdrew in 2003 to test bombs. South Sudan, as a new state, has not joined yet but presumably will.
The NPT was made permanent in 1995 (it was originally 25-year duration).
Criticism of NPT
- Non-nuclear states criticize that the NPT discriminates: it divided the world into nuclear “haves” (the P5) and “have-nots.
- The treaty’s disarmament pillar is seen as weak – there’s no timeline for nuclear disarmament, only a vague obligation to negotiate in good faith. Decades on, the P5 still collectively retain thousands of warheads.
- Moreover, the NPT’s allowance of peaceful nuclear technology is a loophole: countries can develop enrichment or reprocessing under safeguards, then potentially leave the treaty and quickly weaponize (as North Korea did).
Despite these issues, the NPT’s near universality makes it indispensable part of global nuclear security architecture.
B] IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency)
Though established in 1957 (before NPT), the IAEA became the watchdog for NPT compliance.
It implements safeguards agreements – essentially inspecting civil nuclear facilities to ensure no diversion of nuclear material to weapons. The IAEA can monitor uranium mines, enrichment plants, reactors, and waste processing in non-nuclear weapon states. If it finds evidence of cheating (as it did with Iran in 2003 or Libya in 2004), it can refer the case to the UN Security Council. IAEA also promotes peaceful nuclear applications.
A major innovation was the Additional Protocol (1997) – a voluntary enhancement that gives IAEA inspectors more access for inspection. Many states have adopted it, improving the agency’s ability to catch clandestine programs.
The IAEA has had successes (uncovering Saddam’s 1990s secret nuclear work after the Gulf War, verifying South Africa’s disarmament or policing the Iran Deal until 2018) and failures (it did not detect North Korea’s cheating in the 1990s until the country almost finished a bomb, largely because its access was limited).
Overall, it’s a linchpin of the architecture – without IAEA verification, treaties would lack trust. However, the agency depends on state cooperation and intelligence tips, and it has no enforcement power itself (only the UNSC can impose penalties for non-compliance).
C] Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ)
To reinforce non-proliferation and keep entire regions free of nuclear arms, several treaties establish NWFZs. These include:
Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967) for Latin America and Caribbean; Treaty of Rarotonga (1985) for South Pacific; Bangkok (1995) for Southeast Asia; Pelindaba (1996) for Africa; and Central Asia NWFZ (2006). In total, over 100 countries belong to such zones, covering almost the entire Southern Hemisphere and more. Parties commit not to manufacture or host nuclear weapons. These zones have helped solidify regional norms against nuclear arms.
One gap is the Middle East – efforts for a Middle East NWFZ (or Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone) have stalled for decades due to the Israel-Iran dilemma. Nonetheless, NWFZs are an important part of the architecture as they regionalize non-proliferation commitments.
D] Export Control Regimes
Beyond treaties, supplier nations coordinate to control the spread of nuclear materials and technology.
1] Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), formed in 1975 after India’s test, is a 48-nation group that sets guidelines for nuclear exports to prevent assisting weapons development.
The NSG operates by consensus. The NSG has been effective in tightening the screws on proliferators; for example, when NSG members cut off supply, it’s hard for a rogue state to get specialized items for enrichment or reactors.
However, the NSG faces a quandary with India. In 2008, the NSG granted India a unique waiver to engage in nuclear trade despite not being an NPT member, after India agreed to certain non-proliferation commitments. China has since blocked India’s full membership, tying it to Pakistan’s case.
2] Other Initiatives
There are also the other agreements that complement nuclear export controls.
- Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),
- Wassenaar Arrangement (conventional arms and dual-use goods), and
- Australia Group (chemical/biological weapons)
India joined the MTCR in 2016, which China hasn’t – giving India leverage (India could potentially veto China’s admission)
E] Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), 1963
The PTBT was one of the first major international treaties aimed at curbing the nuclear arms race. Signed by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, it prohibited nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater—effectively banning all but underground testing.
While it did not halt the qualitative arms race (as underground tests continued), it was symbolically important in acknowledging the environmental and public health consequences of radioactive fallout.
India was among the original signatories of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), ratifying it in October 1963.
F] Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
This 1996 treaty aims to ban all nuclear testing for both civilian and military purposes. It has a sweeping verification regime (a global network of seismic and other sensors to detect blasts).
Despite signed by many countries, CTBT is not in force as nine specific nations have not ratified the treaty.
- U.S., Russia and China (signed but not ratified)
- Israel, Iran, Egypt (signed but not ratified).
- India (not signed),
- Pakistan and North Korea (not signed),
Despite not being in force, the CTBT has established a strong norm against nuclear testing. Technologically, the P5 now use simulation techniques for nuclear testing.
One of India’s critiques was that CTBT wasn’t truly “comprehensive” since it doesn’t stop lab simulations by the advanced powers). India famously said in 1996 it would not sign a treaty that perpetuated unequal access to improvement.
“India will not sign this unequal treaty. Not now, not ever.” – Ambassador Arundhati Ghose in 1996.
It is also suggested that today that India could reconsider joining the CTBT since it has finished necessary testing and has acquired simulation capability.
The CTBT’s stalemate largely hinges on the U.S. Senate’s refusal to ratify (it was rejected in 1999). If the U.S. ratified, pressure would mount on other states to follow.
G] Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)
This proposed treaty would ban production of fissile material (plutonium and highly-enriched uranium) for weapons. It has been discussed for decades but talks have been stalled – chiefly due to Pakistan’s objections.
An FMCT is essentially a cap on nuclear arsenals: nuclear states could keep their current warheads but not make new bomb material, meaning over time arsenals could only decline. Pakistan worries because it has less fissile material in stock than India.
Thus, in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), which operates by consensus, Pakistan has vetoed moving forward. Meanwhile, India, China, and Pakistan continue producing fissile material (the P5 have mostly stopped, having large reserves).
An FMCT would clearly benefit global security by preventing arms race. Notably, India is formally committed to an FMCT as part of the 2008 Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal. The FMCT’s fate is uncertain, but it remains a key missing piece of the architecture for capping arms competition among nuclear states.
H] Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW, 2017)
Frustrated by slow disarmament, non-nuclear states and civil society negotiated this treaty to outright ban nuclear weapons. It prohibits developing, testing, possessing, using, or threatening to use nuclear weapons. The TPNW entered into force in 2021 after 50 ratifications. However, no nuclear-armed state or their close allies have joined.
The nuclear powers argue the ban treaty is unrealistic – it doesn’t account for security conditions and could undermine the NPT by creating parallel norms.
Over 65 countries have now ratified TPNW. Its impact so far is normative: it seeks to further stigmatize nuclear arms and rally global public opinion for disarmament.
India’s official stance is that it supports the goal of a nuclear-free world but sees the ban treaty process as bypassing the consensus-based approach and lacking the involvement of nuclear states.
I] Current Status and Challenges
From a high of 70,000 active weapons in 1986, as of 2024 there are approximately 4,000 active nuclear warheads and 12,000 total nuclear warheads in the world. That reduction is a triumph of arms control and geopolitical change.
Yet, a worrying trend is the erosion of arms control agreements in recent years. The U.S.-Russia antagonism (especially after the Ukraine war) has ended almost all bilateral dialogue on strategic stability. Meanwhile, modernization programs proceed: the nuclear powers are all upgrading or expanding (China notably increasing its warhead count, possibly toward 1000 by 2030).
There’s also the threat of nuclear terrorism – nuclear weapons, getting in hands of terrorists. So far, no terrorist group has obtained a nuclear weapon. Still, security of stockpiles (especially in Pakistan or with Russia’s large inventory) remains a concern.
The architecture has so far prevented uncontrolled proliferation. But the system faces strains: geopolitical rivalry is rising, and arms control has stagnated. Revitalizing this framework – through new treaties or reaffirming existing ones – will be crucial to avoid backsliding into a more dangerous nuclear order.
7] NATO: Origins, Evolution, and Future in a Changing Security Landscape
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), formed in 1949, is history’s longest-lived and most successful military alliance. It began as a pact of 12 countries from Western Europe and North America, pledging collective defence against the Soviet threat. Over 75 years, NATO has grown to 32 members, yet remains anchored by its founding principle: an attack on one is an attack on all (Article 5).
A] Challenges before NATO
With the U.S. as the de facto leader, a perennial issue is equitable burden-sharing. Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. spent disproportionately on defence. This continued post–Cold War as European defence budgets shrank (“peace dividend”).
In 2006, the alliance’s defence ministers agreed to commit a minimum of 2 percent of their GDP to defence spending to ensure the military readiness of the alliance. The U.S. grew frustrated that wealthy allies like Germany were not pulling their weight. Under Trump 1.0, U.S. officials also hinted the mutual defence commitment was conditional, which shook allies.
However, currently (2024), two-thirds of its members (23 of 32) have fulfilled this commitment. This is up from just 10 countries meeting the 2 percent guideline in 2023 and three countries meeting the commitment in 2014.
Another internal issue: Turkey, a key member, has drifted somewhat from NATO consensus– buying Russia’s S-400 SAM system and pursuing unilateral actions in Middle East. Turkey’s recent support to Pakistan in Indo Pak skirmish, is also a case in point.
Southern European members focus on threats from North Africa/Middle East (migration, instability, terrorism), Eastern ones on Russia, the U.S. on both Russia and China globally. Balancing these will be key for smooth functioning of organization.
We can say that the Cold War’s end was not “the end of history,” but a chapter in an ongoing story. The coming chapters will be written by how wisely today’s powers act – whether they repeat past mistakes or build on past successes to achieve a more stable and secure world order.
8] Non Alignment Movement (NAM)
Refer Paper 2B -> 2.1) Non-Alignment Movement [* The content of this section i.e. NAM is same as that of Paper 2B -> 2.1) Non-Alignment Movement]
